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Note 
The Substance of the Offence : 
Included Crimes and 
the Philosophy of Substance 
Christopher B. GRAY * 
[Substance of offence/ Substance de l'infraction] 
Each count in an indictment [...] shall contain in 
substance a statement that the accused [...] 
committed an offence therein specified. ' 
Cette note a pour objet l'institution juridique de ce qu 'on appelle en droit 
criminel les infractions incluses. La jurisprudence nous enseigne que la 
« substance de l'infraction », au sens du par. 510(1) du Code criminel, dépend 
de l'acteur. Mais les concepts juridiques ne nous disent pas clairement quel est 
la nature de ce lien entre l'acteur et la substance des infractions. 
Et ce principe, par ailleurs n 'est pas absolu. En revanche, le fait qu'existe 
une ou des infractions incluses est d'une importance énorme pour l'acteur. 
Comme ces différentes données semblent avoir été perdues de vue, il devient 
impérieux que la jurisprudence en tienne compte. 
* Professeur, Faculté de philosophie, Université Concordia, Montréal. 
1. Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1970, c. C-34, as am. through I988, s. 510(1). Though Canadian, this 
and the material to follow has wider relevance, since any jurisdiction must handle the same 
issues, a s / ; , in U.S. law by: "Lesser Offences", 129 Soil. J. 386 (1985); C .R .BLAIR, 
"Constitutional Limitations of the Lesser Included Offence Doctrine", 21 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 
445 (1984); J.L. ETTINGER, "In Search of a Reasoned Approach to the Lesser Included 
Offence", 50 Brooklyn L. R. 191 (1984) ; E.G. MASCOLO, "Procedural Due Process and the 
Lesser-Included Offence Doctrine", 50 Albany L. R. 263-304(1986). Or, in U.K., E. CARYL-
THOMAS, Indictments, R. v. Staton, [1983] Crim. L. R. 190. This study has benefited from 
criticism by Roger Shiner. 
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The common phrase, "the substance of the offence", is a metaphor. It 
draws a comparison between a point of law, and the way we refer to things in 
our ordinary speech. Ordinarily, when we talk about the "substance" of 
something, we are drawing attention to its most important features, the 
features which are essential to it. We use this metaphor to help us conceive of 
the crucial features of a criminal act. The problem in law is to identify the 
crime of which a person is accused, by distinguishing it from the crimes it 
includes, or which include it. 
However, more than a metaphor, the phrase is an analogy. We can 
examine it in order to find out more about each of the things which are 
compared. We know they share some features, and they differ in others. 
There are yet further features which we do not know, but which we may infer 
on the basis of those likenesses and differences we already know. 
This can work in both directions. The notion of substance may help us to 
resolve some of the problems as to subsections 510(1) above and 589(1) to 
follow. But all that I will attempt here is the other side : to show how the 
jurisprudence of included offences both confirms the main philosophical 
features of substance, while generating still others. 
Philosophically, substance was first defined by Aristotle. Initially, he 
asked what "being" means, and answered that it is talked about in many ways. 
The most basic way is as substance. "My son exists". By this we mean 
whatever we can say things about, but which cannot be said of other things. 
"My son is good", but not "goodness is my son". 
Besides answering this basic question, substance also plays a role in 
solving the problem of change, which had plagued earlier philosophers. No 
longer need change be conceived as either the continual annihilation and 
creation of complete things, or else as their constant melting away in which no 
stable moments of identity can be found. Now, commonplace changes are 
seen as an exchange of accidents within the stable substance. "My son hurt his 
knee, but he's still my son". 
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But it is a third job the notion of substance does that is of interest here. It 
allows us to explain how beings can be coherent. Rather than made up of 
pieces which are jumbled together by happenstance, things are structured into 
wholes by the way their parts are ordered one to each other. The substance 
remains single ; its many parts are fitted to just that kind of whole ; but they 
are able to change in an orderly manner which does not disrupt it. "My son 
was hurt playing football last fall, but he's all right now". 
This problem of the one and the many is posed every level of being — 
inanimate, living, and personal — even at the social level where law belongs. 
One branch of our western philosophical tradition encourages us to think of 
simple things, below the lifeworld, as what we can understand best. But an 
equally potent branch looks first to ourselves as what we know best, because 
we are closest to ourselves. According to this, we may learn most about 
substance by looking to its dynamics in our human actions. It is in law that we 
may find out the most about how being coheres into substances. To the 
"substance of offences" we must turn. 
Offences are criminal actions. One of their part-whole relationships is 
that of included offences. 
[...] where the commission of the offence charged, as described in the enactment 
creating it or as described in the count, includes the commission of another 
offence, [...] the accused may be convicted a) of an offence so included that is 
proved, notwithstanding that the whole offence that is charged is not proved 
[ • •J 2 
The reason for the law's entertaining of included offences is a double 
focus of justice. The person accused of a crime must be acquitted of it if the 
evidence does not prove she committed that crime. The same evidence may, 
however, prove that she committed a different crime. If she is acquitted of 
every crime, we the people are unjustly deprived of our protection. If she is 
convicted of a crime with which she was not charged, she is deprived unjustly 
of her right to a hearing ; for this involves knowing and preparing a defence to 
the charge against her. If the newly evidenced crime is only slightly different, a 
new charge after acquittal of the original charge will be dismissed as an unfair 
second jeopardy. So the only way to preserve just protection and fair notice, 
both, is if the new charge is already included in the original charge. If included 
clearly, it gives enough notice for it to be judged at the same trial. The doctrine 
of included crimes is meant to determine whether this has happened. 
The texts of law seldom state that an offence is an included crime in 
another3. That an offence is included is usually an inference from the 
2. Criminal Code, s. 589(1) (a). 
3. An exception is id., s. 589(2-5). 
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definitions of the several crimes, or from the wording of the charge. An 
attempt to commit a crime is always an included offence to that crime4 ; and 
so is the entertaining of the mens rea for an offence lesser than the one an 
accused has become incapable of — usually some focused attention impeded 
by drunkenness. The intruder is so sodden that he cannot specifically intend 
to deprive the old man of his cash, but he is generally aware of throwing him 
twice into the bathtub ; so on a charge of robbery a conviction for assault can 
be found5. But because the criminal attemps, and the crimes of "specific or 
strict intent" as against "general intent" under drunkenness, involve so many 
peculiar problems of their own, the only examples of included crimes here are 
those where, simply, some portion of the actus reus that is charged cannot be 
proven6. 
Neither is the included offence determinable as a "transferred intent", 
nor as a "related charge". That one tried to rob, and found no goods, but only 
a minor he then sexually assaulted, gives no access to a conviction for sexual 
assault on a robbery charge, as though a general criminal intent was present 
and was transfered onto a new crime. Nor does some "relation" between to 
two crimes : first-degree murder cannot be found on a second-degree count, 
simply because the two are related7. The charges must be not only related, but 
included. 
1. Structural Features of Included Crimes 
The included crime is a "lesser" crime, in doctrine if not in statute. But 
this does not mean that it is lesser in seriousness. The seriousness is determined 
by a comparison of their respective punishments. Thus impaired driving has 
as an included offence the crime of impaired care and control of a motor 
vehicle; yet the punishment for the two is equal, viz., up to two years 
imprisonment with a three-month minimum for a third offence8. 
The act which is both charged and included must be one and the same 
transaction9. It is this which "lifts it from the general to the particular". If a 
series of events forms a different whole for the included offence than for the 
4. Id.,s. 589(1) (b). 
5. R. v. George, (1960) 128 C.C.C. 289, [1960] S.C.C. 871. 
6. Terminology is that of D. P. P. v. Beard, [1920] A.C. 479 (H.L.). 
7. R. v. Chabot, (1981) 18 CR. (3d) 258, 34 N.R. 361 (S.C.C). 
8. R. v. Gaudet, (1980), 26 Nfdl. & P.E.I.R. 464(CA.); Cr.C, s. 236(1). 
9. R. v. Cook, (1985) 20 C.C.C. (3d) 18 (B.C.C.A.), 46 quoting Brodie v. The King, (1936) 
65 C.C.C. 289, 297, [1936] 3 D.L.R. 81 (S.C.C). 
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main offence, this is not met. The neighbour of the summer housemaid who 
during the drive back from a fishing trip puts his hand on her thigh, then on 
her stomach, later still her breast, then finally pulls over and rapes her, 
performed either sexual assault or the common assault it includes, because 
the acts formed one transaction — as well as being individually sufficient for 
the count, here l0. But a company whose dealings alleged to be in violation of 
competition law were set into a plethora of counts was not liable for a lesser 
offence upon that set for they formed no single transaction ". 
The charge must be divisible into degrees of effective commission. Not 
all are n. Some offences must be committed whole, or not at all. While 
robbery includes theft, theft includes no other13; although one may "take 
fraudulently" without "intent to deprive the owner", this is no crime but a civil 
wrong14. Some criminal offences can be a simple substance-of-the-crime ; but 
for the included offence to be its substance, the crime must be divisible. 
What the offence is divided into is effective degrees of commission. This 
identifies the peculiarly moral context of the investigation. Unlike the 
conceptually ordered or "static" norms Kelsen excoriates, and just as unlike 
his own definition of norms by nothing but authority, this requirement 
recognizes that norms are to be defined primarily neither by concepts nor by 
"oughts", but by the nature of action. The performance itself is whole, but can 
be performed also less fully, whereupon it becomes a different whole, 
distinguishible but not separated until performed short. 
This is what provides a corrective to the next observation, that the 
included crime is a part of an offence. 
The expression "lesser offence" is a "part of an offence" which is charged, and it 
must necessarily include some elements of the "major offence", but be lacking in 
some of the essentials, without which the major offence would be incomplete.,5 
This description has a pedestrian appearance, seeming to make an included 
offence into a heap of mechanically disjoint parts, an omnium gatherum of 
characteristics under comprehension (intension) no more integrated than the 
separate objects gathered under extension. Even as such, it is not without 
10. R. v. Cook ibid.; Cr. c, s. 246.1, 244(1). 
11. R. v. W.I.S. Development Corp. Ltd., (1984) 12 C.C.C. (3d) 129, 40 CR. (3d) 97, 53 N.R. 
134, [1984] 1 S.C.R. 485, 9 D.L.R. (4">) 661. 
12. R. v. Gaudet, supra, note 8, p. 472; Cr. C, s. 589(1). 
13. R. v. Robinson, (1923) 34 B.R. 527 (Que.); Cr. C, s. 302. 
14. Cr. C, s. 283(1). 
15. Fergusson v. The Queen, [1962] S.C.R. 229, 233, 36 CR. 271, 132 C.C.C. 112, 114, quotes 
R. v. Ovcaric, (1973) 22 C.R.N.S. 26, 29, 11 C.C.C. (2d) 565. 
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some relevance — a charge on theft of a list of objects includes a charge on the 
one object of which the theft can be proven l6. But it involves much more, too. 
The emphasis lies not on the fact that the main offence has the elements 
which the lesser also does; but conversely that the lesser bears its own 
elements, and that these are found also in the main offence. The lesser can 
exist on its own, that is, it can be performed separately. The main offence has 
performances which are essential to it, and that are not found in the included 
offence. 
All this is better illustrated with a charge from an indictment than one 
from the criminal statutes. On a charge of "attempting murder by hitting in 
the head with a baseball bat", the included offence of "assault causing bodily 
injury" can be found 17. But on a charge of "illegally stole and by violence 
committed robbery", no such included offence can be found, since violence 
may be to property or, in the example, by snatching a purse without harming 
the ownerl8. In such an offence put together in the count charged, once the 
essentials for murder in the first or robbery in the second are found missing on 
the evidence, the included assault causing bodily harm has its own ingredients 
stated by the first charge but not by the second. 
The thrust of the logical attemps at parsing this as the comprehension of 
concepts, appears in an example of including impaired care and control under 
impaired driving. In denying this, the judge stated that driving involved one 
concept, the concept of putting into motion ; while care and control had many 
concepts, which embraced driving as one, but of which several others could be 
performed even totally apart from the vehicle. He concluded that the many 
ways in which an offence could be committed were conceptual features of the 
offence, which could not be included within the single "characteristic" 
features of the more extensive. The fallacy is highlighted by the irony that the 
very monitum which would hold it in check, namely that one must not 
confuse the method of proof (here, by driving, by overseeing, by entrusting,...) 
with the substance of the offence (here, of control), is quoted by the same 
judge immediately after that fallacy l9. 
A better statement of these points does more justice to the context of 
action than does the previous test. 
16. R. v. Orford, (1943) 79 C.C.C. 151 (S.C.C.). 
17. Tousignant v. The Queen, (1960), 33 CR. 234, 130 C.C.C. 285 (Que. CA.). 
18. R. v. Bissonnette, (1979) 47 C.C.C. (2d) 191 (Que. CA.) ; also R. v. Prince, [1986] 2 S.C.R. 
480. 
19. R. v. Gaudet, supra, note 8, p. 475, per C. R. McQuaid, J.A. 
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The test is to see whether it is a necessary step towards establishing the major 
offence to prove the commission of the lesser offence : in other words, is the 
lesser offence an essential ingredient of the major one?2 0 
This is not the reverse of the preceding warning, but its correct application : 
not that it is necessary to prove the main offence (driving) in order to prove 
the lesser (care and control) ; but that one must prove care and control to 
prove driving. This means there can be overlapping of offences in the 
individual case without the offences ceasing to be separate and standing on 
their own feet ; their being included one in the other is not affected by them 
being either separate or not21. 
The active sense in which the greater offence must necessarily include but 
not necessarily mention the lesser in the charge22 is yet better stated by saying 
that the lesser is committed in committing the main offence23 ; one can do the 
lesser crime without doing the main one charged, but he cannot do the crime 
charged without doing the included offence24. Thus, one is not able to be 
convicted for an offence of trafficking drugs when he had been charged with 
unlawfully importing them. The trafficking is not an included offence in the 
importing, because the element of transporting which is in the definition of 
trafficking, is not included in the importing. One can import without trans-
porting, as by being a factor or agent ; so one can perform the main offence of 
importing without performing the included offence of trafficking25. 
To this point, the upshot of investigating the substance of the offence is 
that ( 1 ) substance is dependent on the agent ; and (2) agency defines substance 
in a way that is not exhaustible in conceptual terms. The latter point has just 
been dealt with at lenght. A striking illustration is that on a charge of 
"breaking and entering with intent to steal", no included offence of stealing 
may be found, even if the intent to steal is established and the stealing as well. 
For the charge did not require stealing, so stealing is not included ; and the 
intent to steal, which is included, is not an offence26. ' 
The first of these two conclusions should be expanded, however, because 
the next step will be to buffer it. Even when the charge is laid in terms defined 
20. R. v. Springfield, (1969) 53 Cr. App. R. 608, 611 (Engl. C. A.). 
21. R. v. Gaudet, supra, note 8, p. 475, quoting R. v. Ford, (1979), 24 Nfld. & P.E.I.R. 91, (1980), 
65 A.P.R. 91. 
22. Lücken v. The Queen, (1980) 50 C.C.C. (2d), 489, (1981) 20 C R . (3d) 393, [1980] 3 W.W.R. 
673, 105 D.L.R. (3d) 577, 30 N.R. 344 (S.C.C.). 
23. R. v. Foote, (1974) 16 C.C.C. (2d) 44 (N.B.C.A.). 
24. R. v. Young, (1979), 21 Nfld. & P.E.l.R. 77 (P.E.I.C.A.). 
25. R. v. Jarque, [1980] 1 W.W.R. 183 (Sask. CA.). 
26. R. v. Rossignol, (1923) 40 C.C.C. 253 (N.B.C.A.). 
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from the code, their composition is up to the prosecutor, and the way she does 
it will affect what is included or not. Even more is this true when the charge 
includes information about concrete activities performed by the accused. 
While the charge of murder does not include the offence of assault causing 
bodily harm27, the charge of attempting murder by discharging a firearm 
does include the offences of discharging a firearm with intent to wound, and 
dangerous use of a firearm28. Where the substance in this context begins and 
ends is very much dependent upon what one does and how one talks, rather 
than almost completely upon the way things just are, even were we so trustful 
as to take the criminal statutes as themselves "the way things are". 
2. Limitative Features 
Yet the discretion to include offences is not untrammelled. A judge must 
decide on issues raised by the evidence to allow an included offence to go to 
the jury29. But once an included offence is made out, the judge cannot 
withdraw it from the jury30. Prior to that, the judge cannot simply substitute 
the included offence for the major offence, but must indicate that it is 
included ; so she cannot accept a guilty plea of second degree murder on her 
own, without allowing a jury to hear evidence on the charge of first-degree 
murder31. As a result, no jury verdict can ignore this: on the charge of 
manslaughter included in murder, the verdict "guilty of manslaughter" is 
wrong; the verdict must be "not guilty of murder, but guilty of 
manslaughter"32. 
This is only a reflection of the initial limits upon including a charge. The 
offence must be one which can properly be included in a count. So while it is 
proper to state a charge of "robbery in that the accused did steal and at the 
same time used violence which caused bodily harm to the victim", and thereby 
include the offence of assault causing bodily harm33, it is not proper to lay a 
charge of trafficking in drugs by transporting them, upon evidence that the 
accused was driving with the drugs in his car, and then seek conviction on an 
"included" charge of possession. For while the definition of possession does 
27. R. v. Chichak. (1978) 38 C.C.C. (2d) 489 (Alta. CA.). 
28. R. v. Longson, (1976) 31 C.C.C. (2d) 421, [1976] 6 W.W.R. 534 (B.C.C.A.). 
29. Smith v. The Queen, (1978) 43 C.C.C. (2d) 417, 91 D.L.R. (3d) 1, [1979] 1 S.C.R. 215. 
30. R. v. Scherf, (1908) 13 C.C.C. 382 (B.C.C.A.). 
31. R. v. Dietrich, (1968) 3 C.R.N.S. 361 (Ont. CA.). 
32. R. v. Vincent, (1957) 119 C.C.C. 188 (Ont. CA.). 
33. R. v. Harmer and Miller, (1977), 33 C.C.C. (2d) 17 (Ont. CA.). 
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use the term transporter, as does the definition of traffiquer, it is improper to 
move from the factual evidence of possession to one sense of "transport", viz. 
the sense "to carry"; then to use the term with the changed sense of "to 
distribute" in order to charge with trafficking ; and finally to move back to an 
included charge of possession by again seeking out the first sense of "transport". 
That would be to convict upon a charge that was not laid, which may not be 
done properly even in cases where that charge could have been laid34. 
The limits upon creating the substance of the offence arise not only from 
the lack of scope in the charge, but also from its lack of specificity. While the 
offence of robbery includes the offence of common assault because the 
section lists four alternative ways of committing it35, of which "uses personal 
violence" is one36, the crime of murder does not include the offences of 
causing bodily harm with intent to wound, assault causing bodily harm nor 
unlawfully causing bodily harm, because the section speaks only of causing 
murder "by any means"37. A bound alternative alone suffices for inclusions of 
lesser offences, and a free alternative does not, because the accused must 
know what charges he has to meet. While the bound alternatives are 
necessarily included in the offence, the loose ones are not necessarily 
included38. 
The upshot from the preceding section is that the creativity in delineating 
substance which appeared from the first section, is confined rather than 
unbounded. Limits upon the judge by the prosecutor, upon him by the code, 
and upon the code by what it is even possible to say of action, mean that the 
substance is a bounded choice, while not predetermined. 
3. Consequential Features 
Whether there is an included offence in a charge, whether the substance 
of the crime is some included offence or must be left with the offence stated in 
the charge, is of course important because it determines whether one can be 
convicted of a crime or not. But a few procedural consequences of the 
decision can highlight with greater finesse some ways this consequence can 
arrive. 
34. Turcotte v. R. (Que.), (1981) 22 CR. (3d) 46 (Que. C. Sess. Peace) ; Narcotic Control Act, 
R.S.C. 1970, c. N-l ,s . 2,4(1). 
35. Cr. C , s. 302. 
36. Luckett v. The Queen, supra, note 22. 
37. Cr. C , s. 222. 
38. Simpson v. The Queen (N° 2), (1981) 20 CR. (3d), 58 C.C.C. (2d) 122 (Ont. CA.). 
804 Les Cahiers de Droit (1988) 29 C. de D. 795 
RE prescription : Prosecution for a lesser offence cannot be started 
beyond the time prescribed for launching the prosecution of that lesser 
offence, even if prosecution for the major charged offence has a longer 
prescription period, or was launched within its proper delay39. RE extradition : 
Again, an accused cannot be convicted of the lesser offence when he has been 
extradited for trial on a greater offence, unless the lesser offence also is an 
extraditable crime40. RE appeal : On another tack, the Crown does not have 
the right of appeal to the Supreme Court it otherwise would upon the 
accused's conviction only for a lesser offence, since there has been no 
acquittal on the charge as laid. Because the crime he was convicted for was 
included in that charge, it is upon that charge that he was convicted41. RE 
retrial : Although the details are complicated, in general this means that one 
convicted on either the greater or lesser charge, or acquitted on either, cannot 
be retried on either. Had they been simply different, and not included in one 
another, he could be tried anew on the other without any defence of autrefois 
acquit, autrefois convict or res judicata42. RE jurisdication : The court must 
have jurisdiction to try the included offence, not only the major offence, in 
order to do so ; and even if it has, it cannot try the lesser unless it also has the 
jurisdiction to try the main offence43. 
RE amendment: Finally, an amendment to the indictment, which 
otherwise would be a question of law for the judge as to whether it need be 
returned to the grand jury, is in the case of an included offence only an 
amendment to form rather than substance. The substance, the included 
offence, is already included in the charged crime44. 
Conclusion 
As to the substance of included crimes, the conclusions to be drawn from 
these features are that (1) human actions determine which things are substances 
39. R. v. Hoskins, (1930) 52 C . C C 365 (Alta. CA. ) ; now, e.g., s. 721(2), for summary 
convictions. 
40. R. v. Flannery, (1923) 40 C . C C 263 (Alta. CA.) ; now, Extradition Act, R.S.C 1970, c. E-
21, s. 34, 36, 37. 
41. R. v. Wilmot, (1941), 75 C . C C 161 (S.C.C); now s. 621(1). See now Guillemette v. The 
Queen, S.C.C, 24 avril 1986, #18145. 
42. Constitution Act, 1982, (Canada Act, 1982, U.K. 1982, c. ll .Sch. B.)s. 11(h). See also Head 
v. The Queen, [1986] 2 S.C.R. 684. 
43. R. v. Letendre, (1928) 50 C . C C 419 (Alta. CA.) : R. v. Law, (1916) 25 C . C C 251 (Alta. 
CA.). 
44. R. v. Vincent, (1957) 119 C . C C 188 (Ont. CA. ) ; s. 529 (6). 
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and which are not; but (2) human actions do not determine this in an 
unrestricted manner ; and (3) it makes a great deal of difference to citizens 
that these propositions are true. These three conclusions sound like platitudes. 
But while apparently platitudinous, these propositions run contrary to 
several equally commonplace counterparts. First, as to both inanimate and 
living substances, the identity of a substance is assumed to be a necessary 
effect from inexorable laws of nature. That is, (1) causes other than human 
action determine the identity of human substance. Next, we tend to think that 
the things which we make as cultural objects are completely different from 
this : we think of our associations, our institutions, and our laws, as being 
whatever we choose to make of them. That is, (2) human actions determine 
the identity of substance without limit. So, unlike among pre-social beings, 
(3) substance is an irrelevant consideration ; it makes no difference to anyone 
that the truth about it happens to be. 
What jurisprudence offers us is a disproof of these contrary commonplaces. 
So our results are not themselves so banal as they might have seemed. And, 
especially if it is true that our own actions are the best way to understand the 
world, the insights that included offences give us into the "substance of the 
offence" may also give us hints as to how best we can grasp a much wider 
horizon of being. 
